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Sammendrag, innholdsfortegnelse eller innholdsbeskrivelse  En oversikt over historikken bak tanken om en internasjonal råvareavtale for bly og sink. En komite med H. Fangel som formann, utarbeidet 10.05.1965 et avtaleutkast til en slik råvareavtale. Forslaget ble aldri satt ut i livet.				

DANNELSEN AV DEN INTERNASJONALE STUDIEGRUPPE FOR  
BLY OG SINK OG VIRKSOMHETEN HITTIL:

Efter oppfordring av F.N.s Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International Commodity Agreements ble det holdt et orienterende møte i London 12. september 1958 med deltagelse av 33 land om den krise som var oppstått for bergverk og smelteverk som følge av at overflødig store utbud av bly og sink hadde trykket prisene til et katastrofalt lavmål.

Ved foregående drøftelser her hjemme kom Industridepartementet til den oppfatning at det trengtes produksjonsregulering, alternativt opplagring av overskuddskvantiteter for å oppnå stabilisering av markedet. Ifølge oppdrag fra Utenriksdepartementet representerte direktør Holger Fangel Norge på London-møtet og de følgende møter.

Formålet med ICCICA-møtet var å undersøke markedsvanskelighetene og tilrå mulige tiltak, men formaliteter krevet lang tid og ulike interesser gjorde det vanskelig å få fortløp med konstruktive tiltak.

På et nytt møte i Geneve 16. november 1958 ble det enighet om opprettelse av den Internasjonale Studiegruppe med Terms of Reference som foreslått i dok. E/CONF.29/R3 av 19. sept. 1958.

Studiegruppen ble etablert på et senere møte i New York 4. mai 1959 hvor Rules of Procedure ble vedtatt, ref. dok. E/CONF. 31/AC 1/R2.

Studiegruppen er åpen for alle FN-medlemmer som har betydelige interesser i bly og sink.

Det er beregnet at medlemmene i Studiegruppen representerer 91 % av verdensproduksjonen av sinkmalin, 96 % av verdensproduksjonen av sinkmetall og 95 % av forbruket utenfor Østblokken.

Deltagerlandene bærer Studiegruppens omkostninger som nu beløper seg til \$ 122.000 årlig til dekning av sekretariatet og avholdelse av møter samt utgivelse av månedlige statistiske oppgaver over produksjonen, forbruk, prisnoteringer m.v.

Som regel holdes det plenums møte i Studiegruppen en gang årlig. Forøvrig er det en stående komite som kan tre sammen på kort varsel, og det er en rekke arbeidsutvalg som har behandling av aktuelle saker og utredning av spørsmål av interesse.

Studiegruppens innsamling, bearbeidelse og distribuering av statistikk har vært særdeles nyttig til orientering om forholdene og utviklingen.

Mens den langtekkelige behandling av mulighetene for reguleringstiltak foregikk i Studiegruppen fortsatte de svake konjunkturer i årene fra 1958 til 1963, men i det år ble det et oppsving som utviklet seg til knapphet på forsyninger og en betydelig prisstigning i 1964.

I forventning om denne utvikling ble det på Geneve-møtet høsten 1963 fra norsk side anbefalt realisasjon av overflødige amerikanske strategiske lagerbeholdninger for å skaffe større, prompte forsyninger og derved på den ene side å lette den anstrengte markedssituasjon og på den annen side å minske de fastfrysede lagerbeholdninger som måtte forutsees å kunne trykke markedet i fremtidige nye depresjonsperioder.

På møtet i den stående komite i New York 28. februar 1965 foreslo Norge å benytte situasjonen til nærmere vurdering av en råvareavtale for bly og sink, og man fikk medhold i utarbeidelse av et utkast til en slik avtale.

En redaksjonskomite med direktør Fangel som formann og med deltagelse av S.L. Kaul fra India, Gonzales Sosa fra Mexico og Witold Jurasz fra Polen og med medvirken av lederen av FN.s råvareavdeling i New York, Perce Judd, møttes i Oslo 5.-9. mai 1965 og utarbeidet et avtaleutkast som ble forelagt på Studiegruppens plenums møte i Tokyo i november 1965, rei. vedlagte fotokopi.

Flere utviklingsland og østblokk-land støttet tanken om en internasjonal råvareavtale for bly og sink, men flere industriland mente at det måtte foretas videregående studier før noe standpunkt kunne tas.

I mellemtiden var det i juli 1964 blitt bekjentgjort en produsentpris for sink som de store smelteverk fulgte utenfor Nord-Amerika og som viste seg å få en modererende virkning på markedet.

Under disse omstendigheter ble det mindre behov for den påtenkte internasjonale råvareavtale så lenge ordningen med produsentpris for sink ble opprettholdt med rimelige resultater for produsenter og forbrukere.

Produsentprisen for sink har i de følgende år vært holdt stabil i lange perioder men er av og til blitt regulert, vesentlig som følge av inflasjonen og endringer i valutakurser. Noteringene på London metallbørs også i årene etter 1964 har vært utsatt for store svingninger.

I 1977 er det imidlertid dessverre blitt et sammenbrudd av sinkmarkedet etter en intervensjon av det amerikanske Justisdepartement overfor produsentprisen.

Draft for consideration

Development of an international arrangement for lead and zinc

Covering note

In accordance with the decision taken at the nineteenth session of the Standing Committee, the attached notes have been drafted to afford "an outline for consideration by the Special Working Group of the International Lead and Zinc Study Group".

The notes were prepared in the first instance by a small group, which under the leadership of

Mr. Holger Fangel (Norway)

and with the participation of

Mr. S. L. Kaul (India),

Mr. Gonzalez Sosa (Mexico) and

Mr. W. Jurasz (Poland)

convened in Oslo 5 to 9 May 1965. The latter present at the invitation of the group. The group gratefully received the guidance of Mr. Perce R. Judd from the Secretariat. The members of the group acted primarily in their personal capacities and convened informally.

The drafting committee, which had been formed on this subject (paragraphs 25 and 26 of document LZ/SC/Min.16) decided to circulate the notes as a convenient basis of discussion, it being understood that these notes do not in any way bind any of the Governments concerned.

The draft takes into account recent submissions by Governments (LZ/SC/71 and add. 1 and 2) as well as other discussions in the Study Group. It is hoped that the notes may stimulate comments and observations at the forthcoming meeting of the Special Working Group.

## I. Introduction

1. A number of Governments have stressed particularly the value of an international arrangement for dealing with surplus conditions in commodity markets, while other have stressed its possible usefulness for dealing with shortages.

It is a fact that surplus conditions tend to cause severe depression of prices and lead to economic difficulties for industries and countries and hinder sound development of production, whereas periods of shortage may cause excessively high prices detrimental to consumers and thus may limit the use of the commodity, which in the long terms may be disadvantageous to producers.

The most important contribution of an international arrangement may be to lessen the extent of the variations between surplus and shortage conditions, thus bringing a greater stability. It is obvious that violent and excessive price fluctuations on basic raw materials as lead and zinc are dangerous to both producers and consumers and have adverse repercussions on execution of plans for economic development as well as financial operations.

2. A recent report of an UN Committee stressed the need for continuity in the negotiations for commodity agreements, document par. . In this report attention was drawn to the fact that frequently interests in commodity agreements have dwindled as result of improved market consitions so that no machinery was subsequently available at the time when it was needed.

There is no reason to delay making a study of the value of an international agreement in lead and zinc and of the kind of arrangement, which might be followed, if such an agreement is to be effective. The rapid fall in prices for prompt lead deliveries from £ 152 to £ 109 per ton in the 8 weeks prior to the meeting of this Group emphasizes the rapidity, with which market changes can occur.

3. Furthermore, at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva in 1964 it was agreed that efforts should be made to develop agreements in a wider range of commodities, particularly for the purpose of providing assured income for developing exporting countries and so prevent interference with their development programmes because of lack of export proceeds.

On the other hand, the interests of developing importing countries must also be taken into account.

4. An international commodity arrangement in lead and zinc can be formulated in such a way as to bring benefit to producers and consumers, to exporters and importers alike.
5. The effective working of the agreement should be made a matter of joint responsibility, and the efforts necessary would need to be shared by all.

Through the International Lead and Zinc Study Group producers and consumers in all countries have co-operated in joint efforts since 1958.

It now seems important to develop effective stabilization measures before new problems arise.

## II. Objectives

for an international agreement for lead and zinc may be along the following lines:

1. Establishment of stability of the lead and zinc markets -
  - a. ensuring adequate and continuous supplies,
  - b. avoiding excessive and violent price fluctuations, which are detrimental to all countries and particularly to those in the course of development,
  - c. achieving fair and reasonable prices -  
sufficiently high to enable regular, long-term operation of efficient mines and to allow exploration and development of new ore fields for future requirements,  
sufficiently low to be attractive to consumers and thus also stimulate broad use of these metals, including larger consumption in developing countries,
2. Prevention of depression periods, causing closing down of mines

- and wasting of ore reserves, which may be needed in future,
3. Avoidance of social problems, caused by unstable work and unemployment at mines and smelters, particularly in remote places, where there is less opportunity for other employment.
  4. Improvement of the financial position, particularly in developing countries depending upon reasonable price levels for ores and metals,
  5. Assurance of regular markets, particularly for export from developing countries, which in lack of sufficient domestic consumption are depending upon outlet in developed countries,
  6. Assurance of regular supplies to the consuming countries, which for their requirements are depending upon exporting countries.

III. Methods of achieving these objectives:

Amongst the various measures, which may be used to obtain the beneficial results of an agreement, are:

- A. Co-operation between Governments on such basic matters as:
1. Collection and publication of statistics on production, consumption and stocks,
  2. Continuous studies of market trends,
  3. Development of increased production,
  4. Promotion of increased use of lead and zinc.

The International Lead and Zinc Study Group is already making a substantial contribution in some of these matters such as by publication of the monthly Bulletin Lead and Zinc Statistics.

B. Buffer stocks.

Both in the submissions by Governments and in earlier discussions in the Study Group a number of Governments suggested that the lead and zinc markets would best be served by an international agreement along the lines of the Tin Agreement, which is essentially a buffer stock arrangement supplemented by export quotas. Such a scheme imposes a minimum of interference with the market since the management will not be buying and selling while the prices remain within the range between the agreed floor and the ceiling.

Two difficulties, however, would need to receive attention in the case of a general buffer stock arrangement for lead and zinc:



1. The quantities of buffer stocks for these metals would need to be adequate to deal with shortage conditions. Such a need is apparent from the experience of the Tin Agreement.

Sufficient buffer stocks would be essential to take care of the interests of consuming countries.

2. The financing of an adequate buffer stock for lead and zinc may be foreseen to place strain on the producing countries, particularly those in the course of development. Accordingly the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development might be requested to examine the possibility of securing some international finance for general buffer stocks of these metals.

The question would also arise as to whether the buffer stock should be partly financed by consumers as well as producers.

- C. Establishment of a reasonable equilibrium between supply and demand for lead and zinc on a global basis by adjustment of availabilities to requirements:

1. in periods of surplus by such measures as:
  - a. curtailment of production with the modifications, which may be deemed necessary under certain circumstances,
  - b. building up of stocks,
  - c. suspension of release of Governmental stockpiles,
  - d. limitation of exports.

2. Adjustment of availabilities to requirements in periods of shortage would call for possibilities to draw on existing stocks and greater use of scrap to cover demand above current production.

- D. Access to all markets would allow a free flow of ores and metals to all parts of the world and would thus give consumers an open opportunity to economic supplies. Thereby the use of lead and zinc could be stimulated to the long-term advantage also to producers.

- E. Co-ordination of policies and aims of long-term plans.



IV. Mechanism for consideration:

A. 1. Desired floor and ceiling of the market

It is found advisable that the prices in the open world market, as expressed by the quotations in the London Metal Exchange, should be allowed to fluctuate without interference between certain limits in order that they may indicate the trend of the market and thus may be a guidance to timely actions.

For the time being it is considered desirable in the long-term interests of producers and consumers to take steps to counteract larger fluctuations than between

(£     ) per ton lead and

(£     ) per ton zinc         as floor prices         and

(£     ) per ton lead and

(£     ) per ton zinc         as ceiling prices of the market.

2. Curtailment of productions should be effected jointly by an agreed percentage below basic quotas, which should take into account actual production capacity.

Exceptions may be necessary -

a. when consumption in own country increases more than the assumed curtailment or

b. when producers absorb into individual frozen stocks metal corresponding to the unfulfilled share of curtailment of production or

c. when Governments agree to import and store metal corresponding to the quantities, by which their domestic producers fail to fulfill curtailment plan or

d. when operations are determined by centrally planned economy of the country.

3. Periods of surplus

The market should be considered to be exposed to a surplus, when the prices in the open world market, as expressed by the quotations in the London Metal Exchange, during a period of 30 consecutive days have been depressed below the intended, above mentioned floor prices of

(£     ) per ton lead or

(£     ) per ton zinc.

Notification of the state of surplus should be given by the Secretariat of the International Lead and Zinc

organisation whereupon measures to cope with the situation should be effected by all parties within [-30-] days.

The adjustment of availabilities may be agreed in advance to a certain percentage of the basic quotas for introduction automatically within the above fixed period, which would give the measures a definite and effective character, or the size of the adjustment might be decided in each occasion by the Governing Body, which would give flexibility to the measures.

Should the position of the market deteriorate to such a degree that the prices in a period of [-30-] consecutive days are depressed below

(£     ) per ton lead or

(£     ) per ton zinc,

the Secretariat/Standing Committee/Council of the International Lead and Zinc organisation<sup>7</sup> may declare a state of emergency.

In such a case the curtailment of availabilities within [-30-] days after such declaration may be extended by an additional, priorly agreed percentage to cope with the more severe abundance, or the Governing Body may decide the size of such additional curtailment according to circumstances.

In case of surplus, the consumers should give special consideration to supply from producers in countries participating in the co-operation.

#### 4. Periods of shortage

The market should be considered to be exposed to shortage, when the prices in the open world market, as expressed by the quotations in the London Metal Exchange, during a period of [-30-] consecutive days have been higher than the intended, above mentioned ceiling prices of

(£     ) per ton lead or

(£     ) per ton zinc.

Notification of the state of shortage should be given by the Secretariat of the International Lead and Zinc organisation.

The possibilities to meet the problems and inconveniences of a shortage respectively rapid increase in requirements, would seem to be:

- a. Rapid execution of plans prepared in advance for increase of production capacities on basis of running studies of short and long term trends,

- b. Extraordinary supplies to the market above current production as a relief to consumers and to help to keep prices at moderate levels.

This would mean that promptly after the notification of the state of shortage, producers' frozen stocks and other accumulated buffer stocks should be released, although sales should not be made at lower prices than the agreed ceilings so as not to be to disturbance of outlet for normal supplies.

When no frozen or other commercial buffer stocks are available the only possibility for needed additional supplies would seem to be release of non-commercial stocks.

Under such circumstances it would be urgent to request for release of Governmental surplus stockpiles to the extent necessary to avoid severe difficulties for consumers.

During periods of shortage, producers should market their production at prices, which should not be higher than the agreed limits.

In case of shortage, the producers should give special consideration to the covering of demands from consumers in countries participating in the co-operation.

5. When after introduction of the agreed actions, the open world market, as expressed by the quotations in the London Metal Exchange, during a period of [30] consecutive days have not been below the floor level in case of a past period of surplus, or have not been above the ceiling level in case of a past period of shortage, the Secretariat of the International Lead and Zinc organisation should give notification of such position and the adopted measures to adjust availabilities would cease within [30] days.

B. Liberalization of the trade in lead and zinc ores and metals would give broader outlet and would thus be an effective help to stabilize the market.

Following measures would, therefore, be of considerable importance:

1. Reduction of present import duties by an agreed annual percentage with the aim that these basic raw materials ultimately may be free of charge of duties, which mean a burden to consumption,

2. Lifting of present import quotas by an agreed annual percentage with the aim of an ultimate free flow of supplies,
3. Abstention from similar forms of support, such as subsidies of uneconomical production, and abstention from introduction of new import duties or restrictions.

C. Force Majeure

In case one of the co-operating parties should be exposed to circumstances, which would cause that the fulfillment of the obligations in the agreement would create extraordinary and severe hardship, the [Standing Committee/Council] of the International Lead and Zinc organisation may on application from the party concerned waive the claims of fulfillment for the duration of such hardship.

D. Change in basic conditions

The Governing Body may be called upon to consider and decide substantial problems, which may arise in the course of the operation of the agreement.

E. Duration

The agreement should be ruling in a first period of [3] years after signature.

When [2] years of the agreement have elapsed, the advisability of a prolongation should be jointly considered by the co-operating parties with the view that recommendations should be made within [6] months before the expiration of the agreement.

....

10 May 1965